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APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
This appeal is regarding the sale of a car that later needed 
substantial repairs and for which the Plaintiff-Respondent seeks 
damages from the Defendants-Appellants. Defendants-Appellants 
appeal the decision of the Small Claims Court Judge who found a 
mutual mistake had occurred that being the condition of the ve-
hicle's motor at the time of sale and rescinded the agreement 
between Plaintiff-Respondent and Defendants-Appellants and 
required Defendants-Appellants to pay the amount of the differ-
ence between what the cost of purchase was to Defendants-Appel-
lants and the cost of purchase to Plaintiff-Respondent. Defend-
ants-Appellants seek reversal of the decision that mutual mistake 
had occurred which did not conform to the facts set forth in the 
L o w e r Court and also because the measure of damages granted 
effectively causes Defendants-Appellants to warrant the condition 
of the vehicle where no warranty in fact occurred. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff-Respondent hereafter "buyer" bought Defend-
ants f-Appe1lants f hereafter "sellers" vehicle, a car, on November 
14th, 1986 (R. 2:14-16). The purchase price was $1,650.00 (R. 2: 
18). Some time thereafter, Respondent had a mechanic look at the 
car and it was determined it needed an overhaul (R. 2:20-22). The 
buyer demanded sellers pay for the overhaul and the sellers de-
clined to pay for it (R. 2:23). At the time of the sale, sellers 
gave no verbal warranty regarding the vehicle (R. 23:24). Sel-
lers were not considered merchants (R. 23:21). Further, since 
the time of the purchase the buyer had driven the vehicle approx-
imately 2,500 miles (R. 18:18-21). The sellers did not defraud 
the buyer with false representations at the time of the sale (R. 
24:12-14). When told about the amount of repairs the sellers did 
not challenge the amount needed (R. 25:9-10). 
The car had originally been purchased by sellers from a Mr. 
Nathan Millett on October 20, 1986 wherein it had been agreed he 
was only selling the body, as the engine needed overhauling (R. 
5 : 1 7 - 2 0 ) . The seller, Mr. Blackmer, was a mechanic and after 
purchase rebuilt the heads on the vehicle (R. 11:2-8). The body 
and the interior were in excellent condition (R. 9:5-6). 
The seller had bought the car for $450.00 and sold it to 
buyer for $1,650.00 because that was the approximate book value 
of the vehicle (R. 21:4-7). 
The Court found there was a mutual mistake of fact dealing 
with the condition of the vehicle motor and that the sale was a 
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product of that mutual mistake of fact and that the transaction 
should be rescinded (R. 26 : 1 - 5 ) . The Court allowed sellers to 
keep what they paid for the vehicle and awarded the difference 
between what the sellers paid for the vehicle and what buyer paid 
for the vehicle to the buyer (R. 26:13-19). The amount of the 
difference was $1,200.00 and the Small Claims Court granted judg-
ment against sellers for the jurisdictional $1,000.00 (R. 26:20-
22)) with the buyer keeping his vehicle. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The facts presented at the hearing of this matter indicate 
that sellers were aware of the condition of the motor of the ve-
hicle. Therefore, the mistake was not mutual. The buyer bar-
gained for and received due consideration for his purchase and 
the subsequent loss in value could not be attributed to the time 
of sale after substantial use by the buyer. Therefore, the buyer 
was not significantly mistaken as to the value of the vehicle at 
time of sale. 
The damages given to the buyer by the Lower Court effective-
ly required sellers to warrant the vehicle where no warranty was 
given. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED ERROR IN FINDING A MUTUAL 
MISTAKE OF FACT EXISTED BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
The doctrine of mutual mistake has been expressed ".......if 
at the time of contracting for the sale of specific goods unbe-
knownst to the parties, the goods never existed, no contract is 
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made," Restatement, Contracts 2d S e e s 286, 35(1); 3 Corbin Sec. 
600; 13 Williston S e e s 1561-62. The Lower Court Judge presumed 
therefore that neither buyer nor sellers knew of the presumed de-
fective condition of the subiect matter of the sale at time of 
sale and therefore there was a mutual mistake. The finding the 
engine of the vehicle had no value at time of sale and also that 
the fact was unknown by the parties creates foundation for 
rever sa1• 
Several facts cannot be ignored and prove the sellers knew 
the condition of the vehicle at the time of the sale at least to 
the degree there was no mistake on their part when the vehicle 
was sold. The facts set forth at the hearing and establishing 
the lack of mistake on the sellers' part are as follows: 
1. They bought the vehicle from another party that indi-
cated he was only selling them the body and not the engine 
because it needed an overhaul. Given that circumstance how could 
it be said the sellers did not know the condition of the motor of 
the vehi cle• 
2. The seller, Mr. Blackmer, was himself a mechanic that 
did repair work to the motor of the vehicle after sellers pur-
chased it. How could it be assumed a mechanic that worked on the 
motor would be completely wrong in his evaluation of the mechan-
ics of the same motor he worked on. 
3. When confronted in Court with the amount of repairs 
needed on the vehicle the sellers did not challenge said amount. 
T h i s fact implies the possibility the amount of repairs was 
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understandable to the sellers' knowledge. 
4, The sellers gave no verbal warranty at the time of 
sale. Also, the implication is that sellers may have known or 
been aware of some need for repairs to the vehicle and not wished 
to become further obligated. 
Two famous cases regarding rescission for mutual mistake 
occurred (1) where a cow thought to be sterile was sold at a time 
when it was pregnant Sherwood vs. Walker, 33 N.W. 919(1887) and 
(2) where a pretty stone was sold that turned out to be valuable, 
Wood vs. Boynton, 25 N.W. 42(1885). In either case the doctrine 
of mutual mistake was applied because of the factual matter that 
neither party was in fact aware of the value of what was being 
dealt. The facts of this matter strongly indicate and prove the 
seller was aware of the value or quality of what was being sold, 
thus eliminating the possibility of mutual mistake of fact. 
In the alternative, the buyer bargained for the value he re-
c e i v e d . The condition of the interior and exterior of the 
vehicle was excellent. Buyer and seller were aware, however, the 
vehicle was not new. He received the full value of his purchase 
for at least twenty five hundred miles. After having the benefit 
of use of the vehicle for said time it would be erroneous to now 
apply the repairs requested arbitrarily back to the time of pur-
chase as though the loss were simultaneous with the sale. In 
effect, therefore, the value of what could have been expected of 
purchase was received by the buyer aid therefore there is no mis-
take of quality also UDon the buyer's part either. 
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The doctrine espoused by the Sherwood and Wood cases sets 
forth mutual mistake is where a striking mistake occurs such as 
where purchase was made of a vehicle and when it was started up 
it did not run due to serious defect to the surprise of both par-
ies. The facts herein indicate and the doctrine set forth here-
before cannot be applied to this matter where the mistake was not 
mutual and the mistaken party received due consideration as bar-
gained. The fact also exists that the doctrine of mistake is 
seldom applied in the State of Utah as set forth in Kiahties vs. 
Mills » 640 P2d 9 (Utah 1982). 
II. THE DAMAGES GRANTED BY THE COURT REQUIRE APPELLANTS TO 
WARRANT THE VALUE OF THE VEHICLE WHERE NO WARRANTY WAS GIVEN 
The damages granted by the Lower Court require sellers to 
warrant the value of the vehicle at time of sale. Previous to 
giving such remedy the Lower Court found sellers did not give a 
warranty by implication and that because they were not merchants 
there was no express warranty covering the sale of the vehicle. 
The findings of the Court therefore created a different conclu-
sion at law than was reached by the findings of fact of the Lower 
Court. Since the value of the vehicle was not warranted by sel-
lers they should not be liable for its value. 
CONCLUSION 
The Small Claims Court erred in invoking the doctrine of 
mutual mistake in this case since the sellers were aware of the 
condition of the vehicle and the buyer purchased at arms length, 
then receiving the benefit of his bargain later requested repairs 
and wrongfully sought the sellers to pay the same. Sellers not 
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having misrepresented the value of the vehicle and not having 
warranted the vehicle should not be required to reimburse the 
buyer for the value of his purchase determined substantially 
after sale and use by the buyer. 
Further, the damages granted by the Court were in error as 
it required the sellers to warrant the value of the vehicle sold 
where no imDlied or express warranty existed. 
Respectfully submitted this ZL&, day of March, 1987. 
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